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Issues in cross-border funding of Chilean banks 
Kevin Cowan and Carla Valdivia
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Introduction 
This note looks at the evolution of the external liabilities of the Chilean banking sector over 
the years 2007–10. This period coincides with increased international investment by Chilean 
pension funds – a traditional source of wholesale funding for Chilean banks – the global 
financial crisis of late 2008 and early 2009, and the post-crisis recovery that took place after 
the second half of 2009. The note looks at the volume of liabilities, their composition and the 
terms at which Chilean banks obtained financing. It also explores differences between 
foreign and locally owned banks. 
At the onset of the global financial crisis, Chilean banks had been gradually increasing their 
dependence on foreign liabilities. Despite this upward trend, foreign liabilities were still a 
relatively low share of total liabilities, and largely short-term, tied to trade finance. During the 
crisis, financing conditions deteriorated, with spreads rising and maturities shortening 
considerably. This being said, however, Chilean banks never saw a full closure of their 
sources of funding, despite the fact that no additional liability insurance was introduced by 
the authorities. 
Since mid-2009, conditions have gradually improved, although spreads over Libor are still 
above 2008 levels. In addition, in recent months the largest banks have been actively 
seeking alternative sources of financing in the form of syndicated loans and offshore bond 
issuance. Due to a relatively well developed derivatives market, this has been achieved 
without increasing bank currency mismatches.
2 
Moving forward, the main challenge comes from the trend of pension funds investing a larger 
share of their assets offshore. As this happens banks will probably need to rely increasingly 
on non-resident funding. This can come either directly, via cross-border lending or bonds 
issued abroad, or indirectly, through increased investment by non-residents in local bond 
markets. 
The evolution of external liabilities of Chilean banks 
Broadly speaking, there are three periods in the recent evolution of cross-border financing by 
Chilean banks. 
During 2007 and until late 2008, there was a period of increased dependence on cross-
border liabilities (Graph 1). This first period coincided with a gradual increase in pension fund 
assets invested offshore, brought about in turn by an increase in the legal maximum for 
these investments (Graph 2). Pension funds in Chile are large (with assets under 
management of over 70% of GDP), and have historically been an important source of bank 
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finance. For example, as of June 2008, 24% of bank time deposits were from pension funds, 
which resulted in 11% of bank liabilities being held by the funds (Table 1). 
Graph 1  Graph 2 
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Table 1 
Consolidated balance sheet data of banks 
   Jun 2008  Dec 2010    Jun 2008  Dec 2010 
  
USD 
millions  % 
USD 
millions  %   
USD 
millions  % 
USD 
millions  % 
Liabilities  203'275     211'725     Assets  203'275     211'725    
Demand deposits  27'227  13.4  38'107  18.0  Loans  141'023  69.4  148'629  70.2 
Time deposits  92'128  45.3  88'980  42.0 
Financial 
instruments  23'437  11.5  28'617  13.5 
Pension funds  22'317  11.0  6'052  2.9  Net derivatives  1'384  0.7  –268  –0.1 
Other  69'812  34.3  82'928  39.2  Other  37'430  18.4  34'748  16.4 
External debt  14'159  7.0  13'446  6.4               
Bonds  15'875  7.8  23'341  11.0               
Other  40'423  19.9  31'179  14.7               
Capital and 
reserves  13'461  6.6  16'673  7.9               
Source: Superintendence of Banks and Financial Institutions. 
 
This increase in foreign liabilities came to a halt in the last quarter of 2008. On the one hand, 
banks faced tougher borrowing conditions abroad (see section on terms), with falling 
maturities and rising spreads. On the other hand, pension funds sold foreign assets and 
reinvested the funds locally – increasing the share of bank deposits in their assets and 
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Chilean banks in this period, and government policy concentrated on providing liquidity 
backstop mechanisms for banks in US dollars in the form of swaps and public sector 
deposits. 
This second, “external crisis”, phase lasted until mid-2009, after which external funding 
conditions improved and stocks of foreign liabilities began to increase. Foreign liabilities 
reached 10% of total debt in late 2010, similar to the maximum share observed in 2008. 
What is notable in the Chilean case is the speed of this recovery. In dollar terms, the 
percentage drop in cross-border bank borrowing in Chile was similar to that observed in 
other emerging economies. However, by the third quarter of 2009 cross-border lending to 
Chilean banks (according to the BIS statistics) had returned to pre-crisis levels – a much 
more rapid turnaround than the average emerging economy in the sample (Graph 3). 
Graph 3 
Cross-border bank lending vis-à-vis banking sector 
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1    Includes Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, 
Malaysia, Korea, Philippines, China, India, Indonesia, Singapore, 
Thailand, Pakistan, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, 
Turkey, Latvia, Czech Rep, Romania, Estonia, Russia, Slovakia and 
Ukraine.    
2    Includes Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, Switzerland, 
New Zealand and US. 
Source: BIS locational banking statistics. 
 
This three-stage pattern is common across groups of banks. This is apparent in Graph 4, 
which separates banks into four clusters that share common business strategies (large, 
medium, consumer loan and investment banks) and reports foreign liabilities as a percentage 
of total liabilities for the three clusters that actively tap international markets or lenders.
3 
Where we do see a difference is across ownership. Focusing on the medium-sized banks for 
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comparability, locally owned banks experience a larger drop in their share of foreign 
liabilities, suggesting better access to foreign debt for foreign banks through or due to their 
parent banks in this period of financial stress (Graph 5).
4 It is worth noting that the parent 
companies of these banks are all banks that fared relatively well in the initial stages of the 
subprime crisis. 
Graph 4  Graph 5 
External funding by cluster 
Percentage of liabilities 
External funding by ownership:  
medium-sized banks 
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Institutions. 
Source: Superintendence of Banks and Financial 
Institutions. 
 
Despite their recent growth, from a cross-country perspective foreign liabilities are still 
relatively small as a share of the total liabilities of the Chilean banking system (Graph 6). 
However, this is likely to change over time as pension funds gradually continue to reduce 
their home bias. 
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1  Last data available: Q3 2008.  
2  Last data available: Q4 2006. 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
Composition of foreign liabilities 
Most of the external liabilities of Chilean banks are related to trade credit, although general 
purpose credit lines and bond issuance have grown significantly over the past year. As a 
result, a large share of external debt is short-term (Graphs 7 and 8). 
Graph 7  Graph 8 
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1  Mostly general purpose credit lines. 
Source: Superintendence of Banks and Financial 
Institutions. 
1  Residual maturity. 
Source: Superintendence of Banks and Financial 
Institutions. 
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Large banks rely more heavily on cross-border bond issuance and less on credit lines than 
medium-sized banks. In turn, within the medium-sized banks, credit lines are a more 
important source of financing for foreign-owned banks, which results in longer maturities and 
lower rollover needs than for locally owned medium banks (Table 2) 
Table 2 
Composition of external funding by cluster and ownership – Dec 2010 
Percentage of liabilities 
  Trade credit  Bonds  Credit Lines  Total  Short-term
1 
All  5.4 2.4 2.0 9.8  6.8 
Large  5.7 3.4 1.2  10.4  6.3 
Medium  5.2 0.3 4.1 9.6  8.9 
Medium foreign  5.3 0.0 6.6  11.9  11.1 
Medium local  5.0 0.7 1.2 6.9  6.4 
1  Residual maturity. 
Source: Superintendence of Banks and Financial Institutions. 
 
Moreover, in the second half of 2010 large Chilean banks increasingly tapped international 
bond markets. This pattern is in line with record levels of issuance by emerging market banks 
and non-financial firms over this period (Graph 9). Although the context of global capital flows 
provides a series of policy challenges, a rising share of long-term debt or bond finance 
appears as a potentially welcome development, inasmuch as it involves diversifying sources 
and increasing maturity. 
Graph 9 
Offshore bond issuance by EMEs 
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Terms of foreign debt 
Not surprisingly, the terms at which Chilean banks access international debt markets follow 
the same three stages described above. After a period of low spreads (over Libor), Chilean 
banks saw the spreads on their short-term variable rate debt (the most common form of debt 
for Chilean banks) rise by over 150 basis points in October 2008. Starting in April 2009, 
spreads gradually fell to 70 basis points, remaining at this level until the end of 2010. The 
stability in the last period is remarkable, given the evolution of sovereign spreads in May 
2010 after concerns over Greece and, to a lesser extent, in December 2010, following the 
events in Ireland (Graph 10). Figure 10 also shows how the dispersion of spreads between 
banks has remained close to the levels observed in August 2008, but above the levels seen 
in late 2007. Part of this can be explained by the broader set of banks that borrowed in 
international markets during 2009 and 2010. Graph 11 shows a scatter plot of spreads and 
terms for long-term external banking debt for the sample period. This market did remain in 
practice closed between late 2008 and late 2009 – with recent contracts taking place at 
similar terms but at higher spreads than in 2007 and early 2008. 
Graph 10  Graph 11 
Cost of short-term external loans
1 
Weighted average, in basis points 
Right-hand scale shows months to maturity 
Cost of long-term external loans
1 
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1  Short-term  variable  rate  bank  loans.    
2  Moving 
quarter average. 
Source: Central Bank of Chile. 
1  Long-term bank loans; excludes bonds. 
Source: Central Bank of Chile. 
 
As spreads rose, the maturity of short-term variable debt fell from 13 to six months. After 
mid-2009, terms gradually increased to close to 10 months (Graph 10). As mentioned above, 
the share of long-term debt in gross debt was a minor share of debt flows for most quarters 
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Foreign debt flows by term and interest rate 
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Source: Central Bank of Chile. 
The pattern of spreads and maturities observed in short-term variable rate debt is broadly 
prevalent across bank clusters and ownership (Graphs 13 and 14). 
Graph 13  Graph 14 
Cost of external financing by ownership
1
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Right-hand scale shows months to maturity 
Cost of external financing by cluster
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1  Short-term variable rate bank loans.    
2  Moving quarter average. 
Source: Central Bank of Chile 
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All in all, Chilean banks saw rising spreads and shortening maturities after October 2008. 
Interestingly, spreads on short-term debt fell as early as April 2009, with maturities taking 
considerably longer to approach pre-crisis levels. 
Table 3  Table 4 
Spreads and maturities of  
short-term loans
1, 2 
In basis points, months 
Determinants of credit spreads 
Dependent variable spread over Libor 
Loan-level data 
   Trade credit  Credit lines 
   Spread Term Spread Term  Variable A  B  C  D 
Term 0.02*** 0.02***  0.02***  –0.01* 
All 50  6  73  13 
ln (amount) 0.05*** 0.05***  0.05***  0.03 
Foreign 0.01  0  0.02* –0.27** 
Large 55  13  80  13 
Medium 0.05** 0.04*  0.06*** 0.18** 
Trade loan –0.16  –0.16***       
Medium 42  6  60  6 
State bank    –0.10**  –0.09***    
R2 0.23  0.24  0.37  0.23 
Medium foreign  40 6 51 6 
N 1163  1163  1011  147 
Medium local  53  6  85  13  Sample  S2 2009 to S2 2010  S2 2008 to 
S1 2009 
1  Loans with terms of 13 months or less.    
2  Median 
of second semester of 2010. 
Source: Central Bank of Chile. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Columns A, B and D are OLS estimates for dollar-
denominated floating rate short-term loans. Column C 
is a subsample of trade-related dollar-denominated 
floating rate short-term loans. Sample period shown in 
table. Constant included but not reported. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Central Bank 
of Chile data. 
 
A more detailed look at debt contracted during 2010 shows that larger banks pay higher 
spreads than medium-sized ones, but take on longer-term loans. Within medium banks, 
foreign-owned subsidiaries pay lower spreads on both trade credit and general purpose 
credit lines, and tend to have shorter terms (Table 3). To disentangle the confounding effects 
of terms, ownership and size on spreads, Table 4 reports the results of a simple regression 
of credit spreads on loan and bank characteristics using individual loan data for those loans 
contracted between the second semester of 2009 and the second semester of 2010. We 
restrict the sample to floating rate loans denominated in US dollars. After controlling for the 
term of the loan and a dummy for whether the loan is trade-related, we find no significant 
difference between foreign and local banks (the dummy for foreign banks is not statistically 
significant at conventional confidence levels). Medium-sized banks, on the other hand, pay 
significantly higher spreads – 5 basis points higher (column A). This result is robust to 
controlling for the state-owned bank (column B) or restricting the sample to only trade-related 
credits (column C). We do find, however, that during the “crisis period”, from the fourth 
quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2009, foreign-owned banks paid significantly lower 
spreads, which is consistent with the smaller drop in foreign debt as a share of liabilities 
discussed above (column D). 
Finally, Graph 15 shows that during 2010 there was a high correlation between the spreads 
paid on a subset of comparable cross-border bank loans and spreads over overnight index 
swaps of bank prime borrowing rates in domestic markets. This suggests that foreign lenders 




Local versus foreign spread – sample
1 
Simple average for 2010, basis points 
 
1    Only foreign trade USD loans with terms of   
0–180 days and floating rate. 
Source: Central Bank of Chile. 
Discussion 
Since mid-2009, Chilean banks have been once again increasing their use of foreign credit 
as a source of funding. This is due to improving external conditions and increased offshore 
investment by Chilean pension funds. To a large extent, this new wave of external borrowing 
has taken place on similar terms to those observed prior to 2008: mostly short-term external 
debt related to trade credit. This leads to a series of policy challenges. 
First, despite the fact that Chilean banks were not shut out of external borrowing after 
October 2008, the cost of external funds rose and maturities shortened, particularly for 
smaller, locally owned banks. Moreover, liquidity hoarding due to concerns by banks about 
their ability to roll over debt led the Central Bank to provide US dollar swaps. Hence, the 
crisis has provided a stark illustration of the funding liquidity risk (as well as the interest rate 
risk) associated with cross-border bank lending. As has been extensively discussed, when 
faced with domestic solvency or liquidity problems, banks immediately curtail foreign lending. 
It is therefore important for recipient banks to diversify funding sources and actively extend 
the maturity of foreign debt to reduce this risk. Careful thought should therefore be given to 
current liquidity and market risk regulation so as to evaluate whether it provides adequate 
protection from events such as those observed in late 2008. 
Second, recent external bond issuance is a favourable development for the Chilean banking 
sector. Indeed, it appears to be a potential “silver lining” in the current environment of low 
returns in developed economies and lower perceived risk in emerging markets. In Chile, 
however, only a small sample of banks has tapped international debt markets so far. 
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banks. This being the case, policymakers should help promote stable sources of long-term 
external funding for medium-sized banks. The alternative of large banks intermediating these 
funds to other banks is worrying from a systemic perspective, as it compounds too big to fail 
concerns. The safer alternative is for medium-sized banks to rely on domestic bond 
issuance, purchased by residents and non-residents. The challenge is to further develop 
domestic bond markets in a context in which many countries are concerned with the risks of 
“excess” cross-border capital flows. 
One option for doing so is to allow for the development of covered bonds. In Chile, legislation 
has recently been passed that allows the creation of bonds that remain on balance sheet but 
are backed by a pool of mortgages in the event of bank liquidation. 